By Pavlo Burdiak, Oleksandr Monastyrskyi and Oleksiy Tretyakov-Grodzevych, for EUvsDisinfo
Since its founding in 2013, Telegram has rapidly evolved from a niche messaging app into one of the world’s most influential digital platforms, and its growing presence in the European Union raises urgent challenges. Praised for its functionality and freedom, yet notorious for its weak moderation and ties with Russia, Telegram is increasingly used for malicious campaigns. From anti-vaccination and flat-Earth conspiracies to disinformation and illicit activity, its freewheeling growth challenges the EU’s information space and digital governance frameworks. Drawing on EU-wide data and Ukraine’s experience, this article explores how Telegram has become a main conduit of disinformation in Europe’s information space and the need for oversight of its activities.
Telegram’s ascent and the challenge of EU oversight
In the past decade, Telegram has grown rapidly, rising from 35 million monthly active users in 2014 to 1 billion in 2025.
Source: Demandsage(opens in a new tab)
Several factors underpin this substantial growth. First, Telegram offers a multi-purpose platform for private communication, group interactions, and content consumption via public channels. Its credibility is legitimised by notable figures who use the platform, including political actors such as French President Emmanuel Macron(opens in a new tab), the European Commission(opens in a new tab), media outlets like Euronews(opens in a new tab) and POLITICO Europe(opens in a new tab), and NGOs like Amnesty International(opens in a new tab) and Greenpeace(opens in a new tab).
Many users also view Telegram as secure, although its architecture lacks(opens in a new tab) default end-to-end encryption, uses server-side key storage, and relies on the less-vetted MTProto protocol, making it less secure than Signal or WhatsApp. Finally, the platform’s anonymity, minimal content moderation compared to platforms like Facebook and YouTube, and limited cooperation with authorities, despite some(opens in a new tab) recent changes, make Telegram attractive to malicious actors. It has become a hub for disinformation(opens in a new tab) campaigns, drug dealing(opens in a new tab), and other illicit operations. By one measure, Telegram scams increased(opens in a new tab) by over 2000% between November 2024 and January 2025.
In addition, Telegram’s popularity is built on co-founder Pavel Durov’s personal brand and dissident image.
Durov boasts about ‘freedom of speech’ on TG. Source: Durov’s TG Channel
Durov’s marketing approach has three main points. First, he brands himself as a defender of democracy and freedom of speech, using these themes to shape Telegram’s identity and public appeal. He consistently claims Telegram gives access to all information, including disinformation that sometimes aligns with Russian interests. While cultivating a somewhat mysterious image among regular users, he has tried to promote his brand and reach new audiences through interviews, including with the conservative political pundit Tucker Carlson.(opens in a new tab)
Second, Telegram has promoted itself as a secure, innovative, and stylish alternative to mainstream apps like WhatsApp and Facebook Messenger. This technique relies on antagonism toward Meta, spreading allegations about unethical data practices and surveillance, and framing Telegram as the only true guardian of user privacy and freedom.
Finally, for much of its existence, Telegram portrayed itself as non-commercial since it uses a dot-org rather than a dot-com domain and as putting privacy first, with Durov emphasising its independence and willingness to operate at a loss. Since late 2024, Telegram has shifted toward modest monetisation as a necessary step for sustainability by, for example, promoting crypto projects like TON and offering Telegram Premium. Combined, these factors have made Telegram the world’s 7th-largest platform.
Major platforms worldwide (as of May 2025)
Source: Exploding topics(opens in a new tab)
Within the EU, Telegram has experienced similar growth. The platform is popular(opens in a new tab) in Spain, with 32% of respondents to an online poll saying they use it regularly. In Italy, the figure was 29% and in Germany, 16%. Respondents in France, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden, and Poland reported usage between 10-13%.
Source: Statista(opens in a new tab)
In February 2024, Telegram reported 41 million monthly active users across the EU. However, this data has since been removed from Telegram’s website and is now available only through the web archive(opens in a new tab) (opening the link may take some time).
As of June 2025, Telegram’s website(opens in a new tab) states ambiguously that only certain ‘non-essential’ elements of its service might qualify as ‘online platforms’ under EU rules, and these elements have ‘significantly fewer than 45 million’ active EU users. No specific figure is provided. Telegram’s lack of transparency regarding user statistics and service definitions appears strategic, aimed at avoiding designation as a Very Large Online Platform (VLOP) under the EU’s Digital Services Act (DSA). VLOP status – applied to platforms exceeding 45 million EU users (e.g., YouTube, Facebook) – mandates stringent content moderation and risk-mitigation, transparency, and accountability measures. Non-compliance may lead to fines of up to 6% of VLOP’s global turnover and, in severe cases, a temporary suspension of the service.
Source: EU Commission(opens in a new tab)
Researchers(opens in a new tab) and regulators suspect(opens in a new tab) Telegram deliberately underreports its user base to evade EU regulations. A WIRED analysis estimates(opens in a new tab) Telegram’s actual EU user base to be at least 50 million, and likely higher. This discrepancy has prompted an EU investigation(opens in a new tab) into Telegram’s reporting practices.
By avoiding VLOP designation, Telegram escapes enhanced scrutiny and maintains lenient moderation, enabling the spread of harmful content. Its opacity and possible underreporting remain key regulatory challenges for the EU.
The hidden dangers of Telegram: four case studies from the EU
Telegram’s rapid expansion across the EU has raised serious concerns about its use for disinformation and its impact on democratic processes. The following case studies from Spain, Germany, France, and Poland illustrate distinct challenges associated with Telegram.
Spain: from pandemic disinformation to pro-Kremlin narratives
A collaborative study(opens in a new tab) by the Universidad de Granada and Fundación Maldita analysed 95 Spanish-language public Telegram channels’ activities between December 2019 and August 2024. It found that Telegram was a hub for disinformation during the COVID-19 pandemic, with many channels later pivoting quickly toward pro-Kremlin narratives following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
Styled as ‘alternative media’, these channels outpaced traditional media in views, using tactics like mutual amplification and message forwarding – methods also seen in Ukraine.
Source: Universidad de Granada and Fundación (opens in a new tab)Maldita.es(opens in a new tab)
This growth strengthens disinformation networks while undermining credible sources.
Germany: election disruption
In February 2025, a report(opens in a new tab), ‘The Federal Election in the Rabbit Hole’ by Der Fabulant, revealed the widespread use of Telegram to spread conspiracy theories during Germany’s federal election and reintroduce electoral myths like fraudulent mail-in voting. Politicians like Olaf Scholz, Robert Habeck, and Friedrich Merz were portrayed as puppets of secretive global powers. These attacks were part of larger campaigns traced to Russia that aimed to erode trust in democratic institutions.
Research(opens in a new tab) by Texty.org.ua and OSINT for Ukraine (OFU) documented 18 recurring narratives on German Telegram channels related to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, which were disseminated ahead of the 2025 parliamentary election. These included the claims that Ukraine was losing the war, Western sanctions were backfiring, and the West was responsible for the conflict.
Source: Texty.org.ua(opens in a new tab)
France: coordinated influence operations through content replication
A 2024 report(opens in a new tab) by VIGINUM highlighted how the pravda-fr(.)com website amplified pro-Kremlin propaganda by systematically republishing content from French-language Telegram channels.
List of the top 20 Telegram channels most used as sources for pravda-fr(.)com
Source: VIGINUM(opens in a new tab)
These channels glorified the Russian invasion, labelled Ukrainian leaders as ‘Nazis’, and promoted distrust in institutions like NATO, the UN, and the EU.
Poland: circumventing EU bans and fuelling division
The BBC identified(opens in a new tab) 22 Polish-language Telegram channels with over 150,000 combined followers that routinely spread pro-Russian disinformation. These channels replicate banned content from RT and Sputnik, among other outlets, circumventing EU restrictions.
Source: BBC(opens in a new tab)
These Telegram channels spread disinformation aimed at eroding public support for Ukraine, amplifying anti-refugee sentiment, and dividing Polish and Ukrainian communities.
Risks for the EU: Ukraine’s experience
Ukraine’s experience with Telegram serves as a cautionary tale for the EU, highlighting how one platform can become a powerful tool for foreign influence, disinformation, and public manipulation. Telegram’s rise in Ukraine has been rapid and widespread. In October 2024(opens in a new tab), 90% of Ukrainians used it. One study showed that for 73% of respondents, it was their main source(opens in a new tab) of daily news. With millions of users relying on it not only for private communication but also as a primary news source, its role in shaping the country’s information environment is profound and deeply problematic(opens in a new tab).
One of the gravest concerns is the proliferation of anonymous Telegram channels that pose as legitimate sources of news. These channels, often operated without clear editorial responsibility, transparency, or accountability, have gained large followings. Unlike verified media outlets, they blur the lines between fact and fiction, frequently spreading misinformation, half-truths, and emotional manipulation. In the context of war, such distortions are not just ethically troubling; they are strategically dangerous. Russian actors have exploited(opens in a new tab) this infrastructure to conduct influence operations, manipulate war-related narratives, and undermine Ukrainian institutions. Telegram’s limited cooperation with national regulators, coupled with its opaque ownership and operational policies, makes it a fertile ground for malign activity. In Ukraine, this has included campaigns to discredit the Armed Forces(opens in a new tab), amplify defeatist sentiment, and promote internal political divisions.
Ukrainian officials and institutions themselves frequently use Telegram to communicate with the public. While understandable from an accessibility standpoint, this practice has inadvertently legitimised the platform’s broader ecosystem, even though a decree(opens in a new tab) by the National Security and Defence Council prohibits the use of Telegram in state institutions and critical infrastructure facilities. It also sets a dangerous precedent. If even state actors rely on a channel with minimal safeguards, how can citizens be expected to distinguish between trustworthy and unreliable means of communication?
This normalisation contributes to a shift in information consumption culture. Traditional media lose ground to platforms that reward speed and sensationalism over accuracy and responsibility. The result is a fragmented public discourse where users increasingly live in echo chambers and consume unverified content, practices that tend to manipulate public discourse even further.
For the EU, the Ukrainian case illustrates the consequences of inaction. Telegram’s unregulated expansion has allowed harmful dynamics to scale unchecked. European societies facing similar vulnerabilities to foreign interference, extremism, and disinformation must not overlook the strategic implications of platform governance. Due diligence in regulation, transparency requirements, and cooperation with civil society and cybersecurity experts are essential.
Ultimately, platforms like Telegram do not just host conversations – they shape beliefs, behaviour, and public outcomes. If left unexamined, their influence can grow corrosive. The EU must take Ukraine’s experience as a warning and act strongly to ensure that digital infrastructure supports democratic values rather than undermining them.
By Pavlo Burdiak, Oleksandr Monastyrskyi and Oleksiy Tretyakov-Grodzevych, for EUvsDisinfo
Prepared by Center for Democracy and Rule of Law
