Measuring the reach of “fake news” and online disinformation in Europe

By Reuters Institute In this factsheet by Richard Fletcher, Alessio Cornia, Lucas Graves and Rasmus Kleis Nielsen, we provide top-level usage statistics for the most popular sites that independent fact-checkers and other observers have identified as publishers of false news and online disinformation. We focus on two European countries: France and Italy. We examine France and Italy as two particularly important cases, as both are widely seen as facing serious

American views: Trust, media and democracy

By Knight Foundation Technological advances have made it easier for Americans to connect with each other and to find information, including details about the major issues facing the country. But those advances present both challenges and opportunities for individuals and U.S. institutions. Not only is more information readily available, but so is more misinformation, and many consumers may not be able to easily discern the difference between the two. Amid

Russia in the Middle East: A New Front in the Information War?

By: , for Jamestown Summary Russia uses its information warfare capability as a tactic, especially its RT Arabic and Sputnik news services, to advance its foreign policy goals in the Middle East: become a great power in the region; reduce the role of the United States; prop up allies such as Bashir al- Assad in Syria, and fight terrorism. Evidence suggests that while Russian media narratives are disseminated broadly in the region by traditional means

Hybrid war as a challenge to the national security of Bulgaria

By Mihail Naydenov, for Bulgaria Analytica Hybrid war is not declared. Instead, it is just fought. The countries under attack are quite often unable to understand that they fall victim to hybrid influence. This is first of all a war of perceptions and the main assault is directed at this juncture. The aim is to keep as long as possible a state of ambiguity and confusion among the country’s leadership and society. The

Analyzing the Ground Zero. What Western Countries can Learn From Ukrainian Experience of Combating Russian Disinformation

By European Values A new Kremlin Watch Report by Kateryna Kruk, our Special Fellow, which analyses different ways in which Ukraine tried to combat Russian information attacks, covering the period from the annexation of Crimea until the end of 2017. Access it in PDF. The following are the main lessons learnt from Ukrainian experience in fighting Russian disinformation: Russian disinformation activities should be considered as a threat to the national security and the means

Framing​ ​Russian​ ​meddling​ ​in​ ​the​ ​Catalan​ ​question

By The Integrity Initiative October, 2017 The paper explores the Russian malign footprint on the Catalonian push for Independence, as part of its wider strategy to exacerbate divisions within Europe. The Kremlin backs Madrid and considers the Catalan crisis an internal affair of Spain – at least at the official level and for the time being. Despite this public endorsement, Moscow hasn’t missed the opportunity to use an issue that -depending on

Robotrolling 2017/2

Prepared by Dr. Rolf Fredheim and published by NATO Strategic Communication Centre of Excellence Download publication file (3.58 MB) Executive Summary Robotic activity is highly dynamic. The online discussion about the NATO presence in Poland and the Baltics shows sharp changes in focus and intensity. The current reporting period August–October has been comparatively free of large-scale, politically motivated robotic interventions. In contrast, the period March–July stands out as one in which content was heavily promoted online. Political

The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses 2.0

By Atlantic Council Read the Publication (PDF) “Russia’s interference in the US presidential election in 2016 sent a signal to the West: democratic societies are deeply vulnerable to foreign influence,” writes Dr. Alina Polyakova in The Kremlin’s Trojan Horses 2.0: Russian Influence in Greece, Italy, and Spain, a new report from the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center. Following a successful installment on Russian influence in France, Germany, and the United Kingdom,

Does Russia interfere in Czech, Austrian and Hungarian elections?

By Political Capital The French and the German elections clearly proved two things about Russian meddling efforts. First, there were obvious attempts to interfere in both cases. Second, that these efforts can be easily pushed back if there is a political will to do so. In this piece, we aim to examine both the interference opportunities for Russia in the upcoming elections in Central Eastern Europe (Austria, Czech Republic, and

Robotrolling 2017/1

Prepared by Dr Rolf Fredheim and published by NATO Strategis Communication Centre of Excellence Download publication file (3.51 MB) Executive Summary Two in three Twitter users who write in Russian about the NATO presence in Eastern Europe are robotic or ‘bot’ accounts. Together, these accounts created 84% of the total Russian-language messages. The English language space is also heavily affected: 1 in 4 active accounts were likely automated and were

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