This is untrue. Over recent weeks Russia has continued to hit residential buildings and civilian sites: in Kharkiv on Aug. 9, in Kyiv on July 25 and Aug. 1, 11 and 20, and in the town of Pechenihy in the Kharkiv region on Aug. 18.
Russian sources are mass-circulating the speculative claim that strikes on residential buildings ceased the moment Ukraine ran short of air defense missiles. The implication is pointed: that the Russian army does not in fact shell civilian sites, and that any impacts are solely the work of Ukrainian air defenses.

The claim is false. Ukraine’s information space has been discussing the air defense missile shortage for several weeks now — and throughout that period Russia has gone on striking Ukrainian civilian infrastructure and residential buildings. Ballistic missiles hit the capital on July 25 and again on Aug. 1, 11 and 20, striking multistory apartment blocks, a school and the grounds of a children’s hospital. The four attacks on Kyiv killed more than twenty people and injured at least 75. On the morning of Aug. 9, a Russian missile struck an apartment block in Kharkiv’s Saltivka district, destroying the seventh through ninth floors; one person was reported killed and more than 30 injured. And on Aug. 18, Russian forces struck the center of the town of Pechenihy in the Kharkiv region, killing ten people and damaging 10 private homes, a cafe, a post office, a shop and at least seven vehicles. These examples cover only ballistic strikes, the kind countered with air defense missiles; in parallel, Russia is relentlessly attacking Ukraine’s front-line regions with drones. On the night of Aug. 17, Russian shelling of Sumy region killed an elderly couple and damaged homes, non-residential and warehouse premises, garages and vehicles. And on Aug. 9, a Russian drone strike killed a young woman and her 9-year-old son in the village of Stepanivka in the Buryn hromada. Four other people were hurt in the same attack and hospitalized with severe burns.
The shortage of air defense missiles grew acute in the summer of 2026. Ukraine’s Air Force even stopped publishing its daily tally of downed targets, because the line for intercepted ballistic missiles kept coming back as zero — there is simply nothing left to shoot them down with. According to Zelensky, Ukraine has 2.5 times fewer PAC-3 interceptors this year than last, while Russia is expanding its monthly ballistic missile output — roughly 60 Iskander-M, 40 S-400 missiles and up to 5 Kinzhals or Zircons. The core problem is a global shortfall: only 620–640 PAC-3 missiles are produced worldwide each year, and the manufacturer, Lockheed Martin, cannot keep pace with demand because its component suppliers are not ready. Compounding matters, the Gulf states — potential suppliers from their own stockpiles — are themselves burning through missiles because of the conflict in the Middle East. Ukrainian military expert Anatolii Khrapchynskyi estimates the minimum stock Ukraine needs to survive this winter at around 300 missiles; Zelensky, for his part, is asking the United States to sell even 5% of its reserves, which works out to roughly 32 missiles a month. Other options for resolving the crisis include striking the two plants that produce ballistic missiles in Russia, destroying Iskander launchers (extremely difficult given their mobility — they remain in position for only 20 minutes), and domestic production: the Ukrainian company Fire Point has promised to begin serial production of the FP-7 and FP-9 ballistic missiles in the autumn of 2026.
For another debunk on the subject of Ukraine’s military capabilities, see Fake: Ukraine Is Collecting Radioactive Material for a ‘Dirty Bomb’ at SkhidHZK.



