Inauthentic networks fuel Poland’s border vigilante movement
Citizen patrols along Poland’s border with Germany triggered a surge in online anti-migration rhetoric, driven by inauthentic accounts and coordinated networks, and boosted by political figures and far-right networks.
Attributing Russian Information Influence Operations: Testing the Information Influence Attribution Framework with real-world case...
By James Pamment, Ben Heap, Victoria Smith, Sofiia Dikhtiarenko, for NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence Publication details Read Online Download This report examines Russian Information…
Seeing the Whole Picture: a New Way to Track Russian FIMI
Russian disinformation campaigns are not random but organised, persistent, and designed to manipulate how people think, vote, and trust institutions.
Narrating the War: Analyzing Russia’s Narratives for Its Invasion of Ukraine
Russia’s relationship with Ukraine Russia’s global standing About the author Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been, by any metric, a strategic nightmare for Moscow.
Kremlin-origin campaigns target Armenia with ‘Ukrainization’ narrative
As Armenia shifts its foreign policy, pro-Russia channels amplify familiar fearmongering narratives By Sopo Gelava, for DFRLAb Dual coordinated Kremlin-linked campaigns targeted Armenia with “second front” and…
Suspicious websites amplify narratives from sanctioned Russian entities targeting Georgia
Three websites launder content from sanctioned Russian platforms and target Georgia with anti-West narratives.
Mass deaths and organs of foreign soldiers ending up on the “black market”: Russian...
The Kremlin responds to the mobilization of foreign soldiers with disinformation campaigns targeting several countries, especially the population of Colombia, where a large number of foreign volunteers come…
Analisys of the Russian Information Manipulation DSet Storm-1516
This report is based on the analysis of 77 information operations documented by VIGINUM and conducted by Storm-1516 between its supposed date of appearance and 5 March 2025.
3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference Threats
The 3rd EEAS Report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) Threats maps out the digital infrastructure deployed by foreign actors, mainly by Russia, but also by China, to manipulate and interfere in the information space of the EU and partner countries.
Disinformation Resilience Index in Central and Eastern Europe in 2024
The Disinformation Resilience Index (DRI) study covers four Visegrad countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia) and six Eastern Partnership states (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine).